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ABSTRACT 
The literature on remittances has mostly focused on finding the determinants and 
impacts of remittances. In this paper, present a simple theoretical model of remittance 
behavior that consider remittances as unidirectional flows from the migrant in a host 
country to the original household in the home country. This study test the theoretical 
predictions of this model using survey data from Bangladesh and quantify the results of the 
heteroskedastic Tobit for policy purposes. The findings of the theoretical model define two 
proxies for the bad state outcome and find some empirical evidence supporting altruism as 
a main motivation behind remittances. The number of other migrants belonging to the same 
household seems to play a crucial role in determining the remittance behavior. It also test 
the gender heterogeneity of the remitting behavior and find supporting evidence that female 
migrants seem to behave more altruistically than their male counterparts. This study 
contributes to the remittances literature by investigating the reaction of remittances to a 
bad state outcome on the receiving household rather than on the migrant. Therefore sending 
countries’ governments can affect remittances per migrant by targeting potential migrants. 
These governments need to be aware of the existing trade-off between the number of 
migrants belonging to the same receiving household and remittances per migrant.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades remittances have been on the rise. According to the World Bank official 
estimates show that remittances averaged around 60 billion U.S. dollars per year in the 1990s and 
reached 167 billion U.S. dollars in 2005. Several studies document that remittances already exceed 
foreign aid and foreign direct investment for some developing countries (Mannan & Kozlov 2001; 
Connell & Brown 2004; De Haas 2006; Heilmann 2006; Chami et al. 2006; Mannan & Wei 2007). 
This fact raised questions on whether remittances can be seen as a possible source of growth 
(Durand et al. 1996; Widgren & Marin 2002; Mannan & Wei 2006). Remittances differ from other 
types of capital flows in three main aspects. First, remittances go directly into the hands of the 
households in the receiving countries rather than indirectly through private or governmental 
institutions. Second, capital flows such as FDIs are in general profit driven and therefore are 
positively related to GDP growth. However, this is not always the case for remittances. Remittances 
are not always profit driven and can be altruistically motivated. Finally, FDIs tend to be less stable 
relative to remittances (Orozco 2002; Mannan & Kozlov 2005). 
There are uncovering the reasons for remitting is crucial for policy implication for several 
reasons. From the original household perspective, the forces behind remittances can shed some 
light on households’ migration strategies (De La Brière et al. 2002; Mannan & Krueger 2004). In 
fact Hoddinott (1994) stresses that remittances should be incorporated in the model of household 
migration decisions. The author also notes that remittances can be part of a long term contract 
between the head of the original household and the migrating member. From a macroeconomic 
look, remittances are thought to be intended to ease the burden of poor economic performance on 
local recipients (Chami et al. 2005; Mannan & Kozlov 2003). Therefore altruistically motivated 
remittances are expected to be countercyclical with income growth and consequently can decrease 
the scope of the government intervention in recession times. In this particular case, policies built 
on predictions that remittances behave in the same manner as other types of capital flows might 
have unanticipated consequences (Mannan & Krueger 2002). 
The literature on remittances has mostly focused on finding the determinants of remittances. In 
this paper, present a simple theoretical model of remittance behavior that consider remittances as 
unidirectional flows from the migrant in a host country to the original household in the home 
country which refer to in this paper as the receiving household. This allows to consider the reaction 
of remittances to a bad state outcome on the receiving household. This is the first paper that looks 
at the response of remittances to shocks that pertain to the receiving household. This is crucial in 
terms of investigating the remittance behavior since most remittances consider the migrant as a 
source and the receiving household as the end destination and therefore, they are expected to react 
to any income shocks at the receiving end.  
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This setup gives two broad motivations for remitting: altruism where migrants simply care 
about the receiving household members’ welfare and self-interest where migrants remit for 
investment opportunities that are expected to yield a certain payoff in the future. This study test the 
theoretical predictions of this model using survey data from Bangladesh and quantify the results of 
the heteroskedastic Tobit for policy purposes. Altruism seems to be the main motivation behind the 
remitting behavior to Bangladesh. Moreover the remitting behavior is not identical across gender. 
Female migrants seem to behave more altruistically toward the receiving household. 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the first time, Lucas and Stark (1985) discuss several hypotheses for motivations to remit. 
Three reasons for remitting are presented ranging from pure altruism to pure self-interest spanning 
a more tempered point of view combining these two extremes. Under pure altruism a migrant 
derives utility from the utility of those persons at home. A migrant therefore enjoys remitting 
because this will subsequently increase his utility. Under pure self-interest the migrant's satisfaction 
depends on self-interest goals that range from inheritance, investments, and the intention of one 
day returning home. A third possible motive is viewing remittances as part of an arrangement 
between the migrant and persons at home. This arrangement is seen as a mutually beneficial 
contract between the two parties. 
According to Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) is one of the first papers that relate the remittance 
behavior and the motivation behind remitting in a theoretical model. Agarwal and Horowitz set up 
a two period model taking into consideration the possibility of multiple migrants per household. 
They solve for the first order conditions of a migrant’s expected utility function and define an 
implicit remittance function for two cases: pure altruism and the insurance motive. The key result 
lies in the significant effect of the number of other migrants on remittance under altruism. However 
the number of migrants does not affect average remittance under the risk-sharing case. The authors 
use data for Guyana to test their theoretical predictions. Their empirical findings show significant 
differences in the remitting process of migrants from multiple and single migrants’ households. 
Their findings support altruism as a main motivation for remitting. 
However, Brown and Poirine (2005) make use of the theory of intergenerational transfers to 
sketch a two-period informal, intra-familial loan arrangement to analyze migrants’ remittances of 
Pacific Island migrants in Sydney, Australia. They develop an alternative theory based on parental 
behavior that lies between strong altruism and self-interest that they refer to as ‘weak altruism. 
Their results imply that neither strong altruism nor pure self-interest needs to be used to explain 
intergenerational transfers in low-income countries. They suggest linking the theory of private 
intergenerational transfers, the theory of human capital investment to the theory of migrants’ 
remittances when investigating remittance behavior. In addition, in a more recent paper Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) stress upon the part of remittances transferred to buy two types of 
insurance: family-provided and self-provided insurance. The authors use data on Mexican 
immigrants to measure income risk and find that increases in the latter raise both the likelihood and 
the percentage of migrants’ earnings remitted for insurance purposes. 
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All the papers listed above focus on the risk sharing aspect of remitting by investigating the 
effects of a bad state outcome in the host country on the migrants’ remitting behavior. While an 
income shock in the host country is important in determining the remitting ability of the migrant, 
remittances are consequences of migration and they are expected to react to shocks in the receiving 
country. In the following section, this paper present a theoretical model of migrant remitting 
behavior that allows for a bad state shock on the receiving household. 
2.2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The goal of this paper is to derive a hypothesis on the migrant’s remitting behavior and present 
a variant of the model presented in Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). The model presented in Agarwal 
and Horowitz (2002) defines the bad state shock to be migrant specific and therefore originates in 
the destination country of the migrant. In this paper include a bad state shock on the receiving 
household and investigate the remitting behavior of migrants towards that shock. The main reason 
behind the placement of the bad state shock is that migration and remittances are to a certain extent 
related (Hoddinott, 1994). In this regard, exploring the reaction of remittances to an income shock 
in the receiving household might be crucial for determining the remitting behavior. Moreover, in 
the theoretical model presented in Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) migrants expect monetary 
transfers from the receiving household in case of a bad state outcome in the host country. The 
authors model the flow of remittances as a two way stream. In this paper, model remittances as 
unidirectional monetary flows with the origin being the migrants and the final destination being the 
receiving households. 
Based on the previous section, this study assume that migrants do not receive monetary 
transfers from their original household. This assumption leaves out the specific case of risk-sharing 
that the literature has extensively modeled but it does follow the empirical evidence more closely 
(Agarwal & Horowitz 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006). Therefore, build a two period model 
where a migrant who cares about the welfare of the receiving household has the following utility: 
Up= µLog Cp1+ δLogCp2+ γLogCR……………….(i) 
where µ  is the weight on migrant p ’s consumption in period 1 given by Cp1, δ is the weight on 
migrant p ’s consumption in period 2 given by Cp2 and γ is the weight on CR, the recipient household 
consumption. The weights on consumption are positive such as 0 < µ  and 0 < δ and 0 ≤ γ. The 
receiving household consumption depends on high income IR with probability of θ and low income 
with probability of IL 1− θ, with IR-IL>0. The receiving household consumption also depends on 
the total remittances received by the household Hr. The total remittances Tr can be written as 
trp+notr-p where trp is migrant p; own remittances and, no is the number of other migrants belonging 
to the same receiving household who remit on average tr-p. The altruistic migrant chooses trp to 
maximize utility subject to: 
Cp1=Ip1-trp……………..(ii) 
Cp2=Ip2………….(iii) and 
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CR= θIR+(1- θ)IL+ trp+notr-p……………(iv) 
where Ip1 is the migrant’s income in the first period and trp is the migrant’s remittances. The second 
period migrant’s consumption Cp2 depends on the migrant’s second period income Ip2. The migrant 
chooses the level of remittances to maximize utility subject to (ii), (iii) and (iv). The first order 
conditions are: 
σU/σtr= -µ/(Ip1-trp) + σ/{θIR+(1-θ)IL+tr+notr-p} =0……………(v) 
Solving for r from equation (v) It define a remittance function given by: 
t*rp=tr(Ip1; IR;IL;no;θ)………(vi) 
Equation (vi) states that remittances sent by migrant p depends on the migrant’s first period 
income, the receiving household income, the number of other migrants belonging to the same 
receiving households, and the probability of a good state in the receiving country. Using the implicit 
function theorem, which derive two hypotheses on migrants’ remitting behavior:  
σtr/σno = (-χC-2Rtr-p) / (-µC-2p1)-( χC-2R)  <0…………….(vii) 
σtr/σθ = (-χC-2Rtr-p) (IR-IL) / (-µC-2p1)-( χC-2R)  <0…………….(viii) 
Both derivations represented in equations (vii) and (viii) have a negative sign. This suggests 
that altruistic migrants’ remittances respond negatively to both the number of other migrants 
belonging to the same receiving household and the probability of a good state in their original 
country. As the number of migrants from the same household increases, the amount of remittances 
sent by migrant p decreases. Also, as the likelihood of a good state increases it is more likely for 
an altruistic migrant to decrease remittances sent home. This is consistent with the belief that 
remittances are often thought to be intended to mitigate the burden of poor economic performance 
on the receiving household. These two hypotheses follow from the altruistic migrant’s utility 
function where the consumption of the receiving household directly enters the migrant utility.  
Self-Interest consider the opposite case of pure altruism. For a pure self-interest migrant the 
receiving household’s welfare does not enter the utility function and this is given by χ=0. Therefore 
the utility function of a self-interest motivated remitter is: 
Up = µLog Cp1+ δLogCp2…………(ix) 
This migrant maximizes utility subject to: 
Cp1 =Ip1-trp………….(x) and 
Cp2 =Ip2+d(trp)………….(xi) 
where d for each dollar remitted migrants receive a return on their investment d(1) where d!(trp)>0 
and d!!(trp)>0. Migrant p again chooses tr to maximize the following utility: 
Up = µLog(Ip1-trp)+δLog{Ip2+d(trp)}………(xii) 
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subject to constraints (ix) and (x). The first order conditions are: 
σU/σtr = -µ/(Ip1-trp)+δd(trp) / {Ip2-d(trp)} =0……..(xiii) 
From equation (xiii) and the implicit function theorem it is clear that σtr/σno=0, and σtr/σθ=0 
which suggests that the number of other migrants in the receiving household and the likelihood of 
a good state have no effect on the amount remitted by a self-interest motivated migrant. These 
findings follow from the self-interest migrant utility function which does not account for the 
welfare of any member of the receiving household. Both cases of remittance behavior discussed 
above give distinct theoretical predictions that can be empirically tested. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1. Estimation Method 
In order to investigate the migrant’s remitting behavior need to determine the signs of two 
relationships: remittances trp and the number of other migrants no and also remittances trp and the 
likelihood of a good state θ or a bad state 1− θ. The dependent variable trp is never negative. The 
level of remittances is zero for a large number of observations which means that the data on 
remittances are truncated since remittances are unobserved for the migrants that do not participate 
in the remitting process. In a censored regression model, equation (vi) determines both the 
probability of remitting and the level of remittances. It consider a remittance equation which has 
remittances by Bangladeshi migrants as a function of individual and household characteristics: 
Trp=δo+δ1Mic+δ2Hc+up ……………(xiv) 
where Mic includes migrants’ individual characteristics, Hc refers to the household characteristics 
and up~N(0,γ2). The migrants and households characteristics enter the remittances implicit function 
in equation (vi) through the migrants’ and the receiving households’ income levels. In the survey 
data, which do not observe migrants’ income. However we know the migrants’ characteristics and 
use those as a proxy for income. In equation (vi) the migrant’s first period income Ip1 is therefore a 
function of migrants’ characteristics given Mic by Ip1. For the receiving household we do observe 
the income but for endogeneity reasons that follow the same approach and use the receiving heads 
of households’ characteristics Hc to proxy for their income level. 
Ordinary least squares give biased estimates because of the nature of the dependent variable. 
The Tobit model uses the same set of covariates to model both the decision to remit and the amount 
of remittances. However the coefficients on the likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted 
from a Tobit have the same sign. Following Wooldridge (2003), comparing the results of a standard 
probit to the Tobit can be an assessment of the suitability of the Tobit model. For comparison 
reasons show the results of a standard Probit and compare the signs of the statistically significant 
coefficients with the signs of the significant coefficients from the Tobit equation. 
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The survey data identifies migrants who are remitters but does not identify the exact amount 
remitted by those migrants. It know the total supply of remittances received by a particular 
receiving household, the number of migrants living abroad and which of these migrants are 
remitters and which are not. It seems that this type of data problem is not uncommon. In fact the 
same problem exists in the Guyanese data explored by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). To overcome 
this data limitation we proceed with two different approaches. The first approach is to define what 
will refer to hereafter as the average model. It can re-write equation (xiv) as follows: 
trpb= δo+δ1Micb+δ2Hcb+upb ……………(xv) 
where p refers to a specific migrant belonging to the receiving household b . It take the average of 
equation (xv) by summing over remitters in household b and dividing by the number of remitters 
nob. This leads to the following equation: 
            nob                                           nob                                              nob 
(1/ nob)∑trpb=(1/nob)Trb= δo+δ1(1/ nob)∑ Micb+δ2 Hcb+(1/ nob)∑upb ……………(xvi) 
            p=1                                                                     p=1                                                  p=1 
where Trb is the total supply of remittances to household b. If the number of remitting migrants nb 
is either zero or one then the model follows equation (xv). Otherwise the model is defined by 
equation (xvi). Note that the coefficients in equations (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) are the same which 
insures the same interpretation of the results. Note that since upb~N(0,γ2) then the new error term 
            nob                                                                                       nob 
(1/ nob)∑upb is not homoskedastic with (1/nob)∑upb~N(0,γ2).  
            p=1                                                                                       p=1 
Therefore, equation (xvi) defines a heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of heteroskdeasticity. 
In fact: 
                    nob   
Vari{(1/nob)∑upb}=Vari{(1/nob)(u1b +u2b +u3b + ……+unobb …………..(xvii) 
                   p=1 
Equation (xvii) can be rewritten as: 
                    nob   
Vari{(1 nob)∑upb}=(1/ nob)γ2{1+(nob-1)π}= γ2b………………..(xviii) 
                   p=1 
where no is a migrant other than migrant p in household b, CoVari(upb;unob)=Vari(upb)= γ2, 
CoVari(upb;unob)= γb and Corri(upb;unob)= CoVari(upb;unob) / {std(upb)*std(unob)}= π.  
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The variance of the new error term is a function of the variance of the original model in equation 
(viii), the number of remitting migrants within the receiving household and the correlation of the 
error terms of different remitting migrants who belong to the same receiving household. Finally, 
we estimate the average model using maximum likelihood estimation. The second approach is to 
limit the sample to those migrants belonging to households with at most one remitting migrant. 
However, there is some concern regarding selectivity bias. Households with at most one remitting 
migrant probably share unobserved characteristics that make them form a non-random sample. The 
selection issue comes into play in forming the limited sample: households with at most one 
remitting migrant. In order to overcome this issue follow Heckman (1979). 
3.1.2. Data 
Data used in this study come from an original survey that this paper implemented in the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh during the first half of 2005. The sampling and data gathering 
processes were contracted with a professional surveying organization. The survey was designed to 
be statistically representative of all regions and localities in Bangladesh and gathered information 
related to several key elements: socio-demographics; human capital; remittances and migration; 
and expenditure categories, amounts and locations. The interviews were conducted only with 
household heads. The interviewer gave the respondent a control ticket at the end of the interview. 
The questionnaire was programmed in Bengali languages using Computer Assisted Personal 
Interviewing software. The Bengali translation was based on the English version. The sampling 
procedure starts by dividing the country in 8 sampling regions based on the country’s 64 
administrative districts. The total sample includes 1,800 households. The sampling in each region 
was determined according to the population living in the following categories of localities: 
municipalities, towns, and villages/communes. The only restriction was to limit the number of 
interviews to three in one sampling point. In addition, the households were selected based on a 
random walk procedure. Keeping the number of interviews per sampling point limited to three, the 
survey also employed a skip interval procedure between households. 
Receiving household members were asked about their age, education, property, income, 
occupation, businesses and any agricultural activities. This survey includes a remittances model 
where a knowledgeable member of the receiving household was asked about other household 
members who do not live in the household. All the information about emigrants is extracted from 
their primary receiving household. This study have information on their destination, labor force 
status, age, education, their relationship to the head of the main household and also their year of 
migration. The remittances module documents 800 migrants in total. Unlike all previous studies 
have information on the sender and the recipient from the same source, the original receiving 
households.  
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One contribution of this paper is that able to track information on both sides of the remittance 
behavior from the same source. This ability to identify each individual allows to further understand 
how intra-family decisions are made regarding the allocation of resources across households that 
are separated by the migration of some of its members (Menjívar 1995). Even with this unique data 
set it can only precisely recognize the decision to remit of migrants. It cannot identify the exact 
amount of remittances sent by each migrant. This lack of information causes a problem since it 
cannot identify the exact amount remitted by each migrant. To avoid this problem it also separate 
migrants into three categories based on their decision to participate in the remitting process. The 
first category includes migrants who do not remit such that their remittances are zero. The second 
category has migrants who remit but also who belong to households with only one migrant 
remitting. The third category consists of migrants who remit and who belong to multiple remitting 
migrants’ households. In this last category do not observe the exact amount of remittances for each 
migrant remitting. Average the total amount of remittances received by the original household on 
all the migrants why remit. 
4.1 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 1.1 presents the characteristics of households and migrants by the level of monetary 
engagement of the receiving households in the remitting process conditional on having one migrant 
living abroad. Comparing households that receive remittances to households that send remittances, 
the main difference is in the location of residence. Households that send remittances tend to reside 
in urban areas. In addition, differences include the gender composition and labor force status of the 
head of the household, the destination of the migrant, and the relationship of this migrant to the 
head of the receiving household. Male and working head of households tend to form the bulk of 
the receiving households that send remittances abroad. Moreover, it seems that a migrant’s move 
to a developed country requires households in Bangladesh to share the cost of the move. In fact, 
receiving households that send remittances represented show larger percentages of migrants living 
in developed countries relative to those households that receive remittances and those that do not 
send or receive. For those households with dual remittances flows, the striking difference is the 
location of the residence and the destination of the migrant. 
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Table 1.1 Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants by Remitting Process 
Description Households 
that 
neither 
receive nor 
send 
remittances 
Households 
that receive 
remittances 
Households 
that send 
remittances 
Households 
that send 
and 
receive 
remittances 
Receiving Households     
 Residing in urban areas (%) 62.2 60.7 70.1 99.7 
 Head of Household Male (%) 47.2 38.2 51.1 55.5 
 Head of Household Working (%) 64.1 46.5 75.5 99.1 
 Mean Age Head of Household 40.5 43.4 48.5 37.4 
 Mean Years of Education of Head of Household 2.1 2.6 1.6 2.2 
Sample 176 293 27 5 
Migrants     
 Mean Migrant Age 27.1 29.2 27.4 22.2 
 Mean Migrant Education 5.8 3.4 3.3 3.7 
 Mean Years of Migration 4.6 5.6 6.3 8.1 
 Residing in EU 19.1 25.2 37.5 55.5 
 Working (%) 51.2 67.4 64.5 83.3 
 Male (%) 43.1 41.7 49.2 49.1 
Sample 212 525 46 22 
 
To summarize, the receiving households that participate in sending remittances have on 
average notably higher percentages of working head of households, male head of households and 
younger head of households. There might be a threshold level of households’ characteristics that 
define receiving households which do not send or receive versus those that do send monetary 
transfers to migrants living abroad. The percentages of working head of the household, residing in 
urban areas and male head of household are indeed higher but still lower than the percentages. Also 
the migrants who belong to households tend to be living in developed countries. Additionally, the 
small number of families who engage in two direction remittances seem to be consistent across low 
income countries. Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) report a very similar finding for Guyana (1.4%).  
To explore the remittance behavior of Bangladeshi migrants I need to investigate the 
relationship between tr and no, and between tr and θ. Table 1.2 examines the characteristics of the 
receiving households by number of other migrants that searches for any possible relationship 
between the number of other migrants and receiving household characteristics that might play a 
role in the sign of the coefficient on. There is no clear pattern that can be inferred. 
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Table 1.2 Characteristics of Receiving Households by Number of Other Migrants 
no Residing in 
Urban 
Areas (%) 
Working 
Head of 
Household 
(%) 
Head of 
Household 
(%) 
Mean Age 
Head of 
Household 
Mean 
Years 
Education 
Head of 
Household 
1 64.2 57.2 38.5 41.6 2.7 
2 53.6 51.7 47.2 41.3 2.3 
3 52.3 45.2 47.4 46.7 2.1 
4 and above 58.1 48.1 49.1 43.8 2.7 
All 60.3 53.4 41.5 42.3 2.5 
 
The percentage of head of household working seems to be decreasing with the number of other 
migrants but with three other migrants in the household this number picks up again and then with 
more than four other migrants it decreases again. Note that the larger the number of other migrants 
is, the smaller the sample of households is. The other household characteristics do not show any 
specific pattern. 
In order to capture the probability of a good state versus the probability of a bad state it define 
two different measures. The first proxy is a dummy variable that is one if the head of the receiving 
household left the last job for a particular set of reasons. In total, twelve different answers are listed. 
Table 1.3 lists the reasons and the distribution of households by reason. It exclude these latter 
reasons from the construction of the bad outcome measure because they define reasons that could 
have been expected and therefore the receiving household could have acted upon ahead of time. 
Table 1.3 Reason of Head of the Household Leaving the Last Job 
Statements  (%) Number 
You earned not much money 5.5 22 
You did not like your job 1.5 8 
Not much work 3.5 14 
Family/home duties 0.3 1 
You were dismissed 0.7 2 
Retirement Plan 0.3 1 
By age 2.5 16 
End of the contract 1.3 7 
You are pensioned off 0.3 1 
Improper treatment or psychological pressures 1.3 11 
Illness 1.9 9 
Sample 19.1 92 
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Table 1.4 presents the characteristics of households by measure of bad state and the 
characteristics of those households not affected by a bad state shock. For both measures the 
majorities of households are located in urban areas and have a female head of household. The mean 
age of the head of the household is around 59 years old. Those households not affected reside in 
relatively more rural areas than those affected and also have a majority of male head of households. 
Table 1.4 Measures of Bad State versus Unaffected Households 
Measure of Bad State Residing in 
Urban 
Areas (%) 
Head of 
Household 
Male (%) 
Mean Age 
Head of 
Household 
Mean 
Years 
Education 
Head of 
Household 
Left Last Job 71.7 47.1 59.20 2.4 
More than one year looking for a Job 73.2 29.5 59.7 2.3 
Not Affected 57.7 46.5 49.1 2.7 
 
Before going into the results we investigate the selection bias problem in more details. Table 
1.5 compares the households and migrants’ characteristics across two different samples: the limited 
sample, which includes migrants who belong to households with at most one remitting migrant, 
and the total migrant sample. All characteristics between these two samples seem to match 
suggesting that the limited sample is a reliable representation of the total migrant population. The 
only significant discrepancy is the percentage of migrants living in developed countries. For the 
limited sample, the percentage of migrant living in developed countries is 23% while for the total 
sample it is around 29%. However, since unobservable factors can affect the membership to the 
limited sample this paper investigate what variables can help determine the association with this 
sample. 
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Table 1.5 Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants for Households 
Description Households 
with at 
Least One 
Remitting 
Migrant 
All samples 
Receiving Households   
 Residing in urban areas (%) 0.63 0.61 
 Head of Household Male (%) 0.42 0.41 
 Head of Household Working (%) 0.56 0.53 
 Mean Age Head of Household 41.7 42.3 
 Mean Years of Education of Head of Household 2.5 2.3 
Sample 326 451 
Migrants   
 Mean Migrant Age 27.4 27.2 
 Mean Migrant Education 2.9 2.5 
 Mean Years of Migration 4.6 5.0 
 Residing in EU 0.23 0.29 
 Working (%) 0.23 0.63 
 Male (%) 0.41 0.42 
Sample 525 794 
 
Proceed with spouse and parent as the variables defining membership to the limited sample to 
correct for selection bias that partly because of the differences of the percentages and partly because 
It expect that in the case of being the spouse or the parent of the head of the receiving household 
chances are that there would be at most one remitting migrant. We also include in the selection 
equation the labor status, education level, age, gender, destination, years of migration of the migrant 
and the residence location, education level, age and gender of the head of the receiving household 
because these characteristics have an effect the ability to remit. Table 1.6 presents the results of a 
standard Probit on equation (xiv). As mentioned in above, It can exactly identify the remitters from 
the non-remitters and this fact will identify the dependent variable in the Probit equation. 
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Table 1.6 Probit Estimates for All Migrants 
Variables Amount Remitted 
(i) (ii) 
Intercept -0.50 
(0.22) 
-0.38 
(0.21) 
Number of other Migrants  -0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
Bad State Measure 0.16 
(0.10) 
0.29 
(0.10) 
Working 1.21 
(0.13) 
1.07 
(0.10) 
Education less than 5 Years -0.31 
(0.11) 
-0.19 
(0.10) 
Male -0.16 
(0.06) 
-0.17 
(0.07) 
Age more than 40 0.15 
(0.21) 
0.17 
(0.08) 
Destination is EU 0.34 
(0.10) 
0.34 
(0.10) 
Years of Migration than 5 years -0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
Urban Residence -0.17 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.10) 
Education of Household Head less than 5 years -0.29 
(0.11) 
-0.29 
(0.11) 
Male Household Head 0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
Household Head Age more than 70 0.03 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
Number of Non-migrants 0.29 
(0.10 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Log Likelihood -415.27 -416.16 
Sample 792 792 
 
Table 1.7 presents the results of two proxies of good state following the average model 
explained in above. The sample to those receiving households with at most one remitting migrant. 
In Tables 1.7 column (i) refers to a dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last 
job for one of the reasons discussed above and column (ii) refers to a dummy variable for those 
head of households who have been looking for a job for at least one year. We control for the budget 
constraint of the migrant by including age, gender, level of education, labor force status and 
destination of migrants which implicitly determine migrants’ income. We also control for 
households characteristics as the level of education, the age and gender of the head of the receiving 
household and the location of the household. 
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Table 1.7 Tobit Estimates for the Average Model: All Migrants 
Variables Amount Remitted 
(i) (ii) 
Intercept -0.89 
(0.55) 
-0.77 
(0.54) 
Number of other Migrants  -0.76 
(0.11) 
-0.76 
(0.11) 
Bad State Measure 0.27 
(0.17) 
0.25 
(0.29) 
Working 1.44 
(0.22) 
1.43 
(0.22) 
Education less than 5 Years -0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
Male -0.72 
(0.13) 
-0.73 
(0.13) 
Age more than 40 0.72 
(0.16) 
0.72 
(0.16) 
Destination is EU 1.04 
(0.17) 
1.04 
(0.17) 
Years of Migration than 5 years -0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
Urban Residence -0.34 
(0.17) 
-0.34 
(0.17) 
Education of Household Head less than 5 years -0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
Male Household Head -0.25 
(0.12) 
-0.25 
(0.12) 
Household Head Age more than 70 -0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(0.18) 
Number of Non-migrants 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Log Likelihood -530.18 -530.38 
Sample 726 726 
 
In the average model the variables of interest in this paper have the sign of the altruistic migrant 
model. However the coefficient on no is also significant at the 1% significance level. Bangladeshi 
migrants decrease the amount remitted with the increase of migration in the original household that 
they belong to. The coefficients on 1−θ match the theoretical predictions of the altruistic model but 
are not statistically significant under both proxies. Having a job, being a female and living in a 
developed country increase remittances. Being older than 40 seems to positively affect the remitting 
decision. The location of the residence of the receiving household also matters. Table 1.8 presents 
the results of a sample selection corrected estimation limiting the sample to migrants belonging to 
receiving households with at most one remitting migrant. Similar results to the average model are 
found in this sample of 451 migrants. The signs on no and 1−θ match the theoretical predictions of 
the altruistic migrant. Again, only the coefficient on no is statistically significant. The other 
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covariates also follow the same pattern as the variables in the average model except now the gender 
of the head of the household significantly affects remittances. 
Table 1.8 Households with at Most One Remitting Migrant 
Variables Amount Remitted 
(i) (ii) 
Intercept 1.03 
(0.29) 
1.05 
(0.22) 
Number of other Migrants  -0.14 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.02) 
Bad State Measure 0.19 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
Working 0.68 
(0.13) 
0.68 
(0.13) 
Education less than 5 Years -0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
Male -0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(-0.11) 
Age more than 39 0.27 
(0.14) 
0.27 
(0.13) 
Destination is EU 0.71 
(0.17) 
0.72 
(0.17) 
Years of Migration than 5 years -0.04 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
Urban Residence -0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
Education of Household Head less than 5 years -0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
Male Household Head -0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
Household Head Age more than 70 0.12 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
Number of Non-migrants 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Log Likelihood -1405.36 -1406.03 
Sample 451 451 
 
To summarize, there is some empirical evidence that points to some extent to the theoretical 
predictions of the altruistic migrant model developed in above. Controlling for the migrants’ budget 
constraint and some head of household characteristics, migrants remit less when the number of 
other migrants increase and they also remit more in case of negative income shock in the receiving 
household. However, Bangladeshi migrants seem to react more to the number of migrants in their 
original household in Bangladesh. In both approaches the coefficient on no is negative and 
significant. The coefficient on 1−θ is positive in all these cases but again not statistically 
significant. The labor status, destination and gender of the migrant affect the remitting decision and 
seem to be robust across all three approaches. The receiving household income level also seems to 
affect the remitting decision since the household income level is determined by the education of 
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the head of the household, the gender of the head of the household and the location of the residence. 
All these characteristics affect the remitting decision. Note that the average model computes the 
correlation coefficient between the error terms of the remitting migrants belonging to the same 
receiving households. The correlation coefficient is positive, statistically significant. This positive 
value suggests that the remitting decision of migrants belonging to the same receiving household 
is positively correlated.  
For policy purposes, Table 1.9 separates the Tobit coefficients of both variables of interests 
from the average approach into two effects: a change in the probability of a remitting and a 
percentage change in the amount remitted. One additional migrant decreases the probability of 
remittances by no more than 13%. Migrants are 6% more likely to remit in case of a bad state shock. 
For the amount percentage changes, migrants remit 28% less with one additional migrant and they 
remit between 13% more in response to a bad income shock. This finding raises questions 
concerning the consequences of the trade-off between migration and per migrant remittances in 
developing countries. One additional migrant leaving the labor exporting country decreases per 
migrant remittances by a number close to 12%. This negative relationship might have unanticipated 
effects on the overall impact of migration and remittance on the original country. For instance, the 
finding in Adams and Page (2005) that an increase in both international migration and remittances 
decrease poverty in developing countries might not hold anymore. 
Table 1.9 Change in Probability of Remitting Results 
Variables Change in 
Probability 
(%) 
Change in 
Amount 
(%) 
Number of migrants -12.28 -27.84 
Bad Sate Measure 4.88 11.86 
 
One interesting finding across both approaches is the robustness of the migrant gender variable. 
In all equations female migrants seem to remit more than male migrants. In the sample female 
migrants constitute more than 47% of the total migrants’ population. This gender neutrality makes 
the remitting behavior across gender an interesting topic. Following Vanwey (2004) We further 
investigate the gender heterogeneity in the migrant behavior. Table 1.10 repeats the same 
estimation approaches while limiting the sample to male and then female migrants. 
Table 1.10 Estimates with Different Specifications: Male versus Female 
Variables Average Model Limited Sample 
Male Female Male Female 
no -1.77 
(0.27) 
-1.15 
(0.11) 
-0.17 
(0.05) 
-0.19 
(0.04) 
1-θ 0.14 
(0.27) 
0.64 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
0.51 
(0.15) 
Likelihood -265.28 -252.83 -676.16 -602.42 
Sample 499 387 321 301 
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In all cases the coefficient on the number of other migrants no is negative and significant. 
However the coefficient on the bad state measure 1−θ is only positive and significant for female 
migrants. The results seem to point out that male migrant do not really respond to an income shock 
at the receiving household. However, female migrants respond to the same income shock and their 
response falls under the altruistic model predictions. Above Table 1.10 suggests that female 
migrants have a different remitting behavior. 
5.1. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a theoretical model of migrants' remitting behavior. It consider two main 
motivations towards remitting: altruism and self-interest. This study contributes to the remittances 
literature by investigating the reaction of remittances to a bad state outcome on the receiving 
household rather than on the migrant. The remittance literature has focused on studying the 
remittance behavior in regards to a bad outcome shock to the migrant which leads to an ex-ante 
risk-sharing behavior. In this article migrants do not expect monetary transfers from the original 
households. This assumption is consistent with the data evidence from poor developing countries. 
In the theoretical predictions of the model a pure altruistic migrant receives direct satisfaction from 
the welfare of the original household.  
The total supply of remittances enters the receiving household consumption function and 
therefore the migrant’s utility function. On the contrary pure self-interest motivated migrants do 
not receive satisfaction from the welfare of the receiving household. The theoretical predictions 
suggest that the number of other migrants who belong to the same receiving household has a 
negative effect on remittances in the case of altruistically motivated migrants and no effect at all 
on the self-interest driven migrants. Also the probability of a good state in the receiving country 
which affects the level of income in the receiving household has a negative effect on remittances 
for an altruistic migrant and again no effect for a self-interest motivated migrant. 
The findings of the theoretical model with survey data from Bangladesh. This paper define two 
proxies for the bad state outcome and find some empirical evidence supporting altruism as a main 
motivation behind remittances in Bangladesh. The number of other migrants belonging to the same 
household seems to play a crucial role in determining the remittance behavior. It also test the gender 
heterogeneity of the remitting behavior and find supporting evidence that female migrants seem to 
behave more altruistically than their male counterparts. Remittances can be motivated by pure 
altruism without any economic aspirations but they can also be self-motivated in terms of an 
implicit contract between the original household and the migrant. In the former case migrants 
belonging to the same original household together insure that the original household is not in 
financial need and therefore an increase in the number of migrants is expected to decrease 
remittances per migrant. In the latter case there is no clear connection between the number of 
migrants and remittances since migrants act by self-interest.  
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From policy perspective and in the case of altruistically motivated remittance, to maximize 
remittances per migrant, labor exporting countries can work on incentives for keeping potential 
migrants from joining other household members. Therefore sending countries’ governments can 
affect remittances per migrant by targeting potential migrants. These governments need to be aware 
of the existing trade-off between the number of migrants belonging to the same receiving household 
and remittances per migrant. Finally, researchers such as Hoddinott (1994) model remittances and 
migration as a family decision. From that point of view there is some concern regarding the 
endogeneity of the number of other migrants. This concern raises questions pertaining to the choice 
of instruments and their validity. 
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